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A R T I C L E
PROBATE ACTIONS AND “SUSPICIOUS 
CIRCUMSTANCES”: A THIRD STANDARD 
OF PROOF FOR ALLEGATIONS INVOLVING 
MORAL GUILT
Louise M. Mimnagh*
CITED: (2014) 19 Appeal 95–104
PROMOTION OF A THIRD STANDARD OF PROOF
When a will is challenged as being executed under suspicious circumstances, Canadian 
courts have historically sought clear, compelling, and cogent evidence to demonstrate 
the will’s validity. The associated standard of proof has been described as one residing 
beyond a balance of probabilities, and is conceptualized as the ‘third standard of proof ’ 
in addition to the civil and criminal standards. This third standard of proof is also 
particularly appealing when allocating the risk of error in an estates context in which 
testators are deceased and no longer available to clarify their intentions or perspectives. 
However, after the 2008 Supreme Court of Canada decision, FH v McDougall 
(“McDougall”), it was resolutely pronounced that only two standards of proof operate 
in Canada, with the third standard of proof dismissed for the practical problems of its 
application.1 As conceded below, there are compelling and valid reasons to disregard a 
third standard of proof for typical will challenges investigating circumstances such as 
the execution of the will or the testamentary capacity of the testator. However, this paper 
argues that for challenges that involve allegations of moral guilt,2 and in cases of fraud or 
undue influence over the testator, then something more then a balance of probabilities is 
desirable, and the more demanding third standard of proof should be utilized.3 
To demonstrate the advantage of applying a third standard of proof for probate actions 
involving alleged moral guilt, Part I of this paper will begin with a brief review of the 
two traditional standards of proof, and Part II will introduce the rationale for a third 
*  Louise M. Mimnagh is a third year student at Osgoode Hall Law School in Toronto, 
who completed this paper for Professor Benjamin Berger during her second year of study. The 
author would like to extend her sincere thanks to Professor Berger for all of his assistance while 
researching and writing the original version of this essay. The author would also like to thank the 
editors of APPEAL, as well as their external reviewer, for their valuable feedback and suggestions 
throughout the editing process.
1 FH v McDougall, 2008 SCC 53, 3 SCR 41 [McDougall] (WL Can).
2 For the purposes of this paper, moral guilt specifically refers to the conduct associated with 
undue influence or fraud in will challenges, behaviour which is quasi-criminal in nature, and 
carries an element of moral blameworthiness. It is not the intention of this paper to attempt to 
categorize the moral nature or stigma of any other civil actions. 
3 Please note that challenging the validity of a will through allegations of undue influence 
requires demonstrating an element of coercion over the testator. In contrast, fraud or forgery are 
separate grounds of contesting a will, yet they are often closely associated with and often are 
raised during an undue influence challenge.
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standard. Part III of the paper will address the structure of will challenges involving 
“suspicious circumstances” as outlined in Vout v Hay,4 and the McDougall decision 
determining that only two standards of proof operate in Canada. Part IV of the essay 
will then provide commentary on the strengths and weaknesses of engaging either two 
or three standards of proof, and suggest that the current structure of will challenges 
may covertly import a silent third standard. In close, this paper will argue that a third 
standard of proof is preferable when addressing accusations of moral guilt as it protects 
those accused of fraud or undue influence from incurring a significant loss of reputation 
or social stigma upon an otherwise disproportionately low threshold. 
I. STANDARDS OF PROOF
Significant insight into society’s perception of the civil action or offense at bar can be 
derived by assessing the standard of proof that is assigned. Specifically, as noted in 
the 1979 landmark United States Supreme Court decision of Addington v Texas, the 
“standard serves to allocate the risk of error between the litigants and to indicate the 
relative importance attached to the [trier of fact’s] ultimate decision.”5
For example, the risk of error after an individual is charged with an offense, either 
criminal or regulatory, can be particularly dire for the accused. A conviction may include 
an individual’s loss of liberty through imprisonment, and a criminal record can carry 
“connotations of corruption, illegality […] a significant loss of reputation and the social 
effects and stigma of such a sanction.”6 In light of such severe consequences, our legal 
system has determined that the prosecution must establish guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt or to a near certainty.7 In Canada, this standard of proof is inextricably linked 
to section 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which ensures that any 
person charged with an offense may rely upon the presumption of innocence.8
Within a civil proceeding penalties tend to emphasize monetary damages, and judicial 
errors “are thought to be not nearly as serious” as those for a criminal or regulatory 
offense.9 As a result, the risk of error is balanced between the parties, and the standard 
of proof in this context requires the plaintiff to establish their case on a balance of 
probabilities so that their position is determined to be “more likely correct than not.”10
II. THE THIRD STANDARD OF PROOF
The rationale for differentiating between actions involving criminal or regulatory 
offences and civil suits, and their respective standards of proof, often reflects society’s 
perception of the alleged moral guilt of the accused’s conduct. For example, criminal 
offences such as assault11 or weapons trafficking12 are commonly associated with the 
4 Vout v Hay [1995], 2 SCR 876, 125 DLR (4th) 431 [Vout v Hay] (WL Can).
5 Addington v Texas (1979), 441 US 418, 99 SCt 1804, online: Justia <http://supreme.justia.com/
cases/federal/us/441/418/case.html> [Addington].
6 David C McPhillips, “The Two Civil Standards of Proof in Employment Cases: An Argument for 
Formal Recognition” (1997) 5 Canadian Lab & Emp LJ 139 at 141 citing British Columbia Telephone 
Co v TWU (1978), 18 LAC (2d) 225 (British Columbia Arbitration) [British Columbia Telephone].
7 R v Starr, 2000 SCC 40 at para 230, 2 SCR 144.
8 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to 
the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, s 11(d).
9 McPhillips, supra note 6 at 141.
10 Ibid. 
11 Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 265(1).
12 Ibid, s 99(1). 
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moral blameworthiness of the accused; by contrast, civil actions involving a breach of 
contract or a contested property line likely are not. 
Yet this well-defined paradigm is disrupted when civil actions intermingle with 
allegations that engage some level of moral blameworthiness.13 For example, allegations 
or a finding of civil fraud are similar to criminal offences as there may be a resulting 
loss of reputation and significant social stigma from any judicial sanction—despite the 
absence of a criminal record.14 As a result, a determination must be made about what 
standard of proof should be adopted in a civil action engaging moral guilt to “properly 
recognize the seriousness of the accusation.”15
In response, some jurisdictions have found that an intermediate standard, which is 
beyond the balance of probabilities, properly allocates the risk of error between the 
parties. For example, Chief Justice Burger of the United States Supreme Court described 
this ‘third standard’ as follows:
The intermediate standard, which usually employs some combination of the 
words ‘clear’, ‘cogent’, ‘unequivocal’ and ‘convincing’, is less commonly used 
but nonetheless ‘is no stranger to the civil law’ […] One typical use of the 
standard is in civil cases involving allegations of fraud or some other quasi-
criminal wrongdoing by the defendant. The interests at stake in those cases are 
deemed to be more substantial than mere loss of money and some jurisdictions 
accordingly reduce the risk to the defendant of having his reputation 
tarnished erroneously by increasing the plaintiff’s burden of proof.16
In Canada, the courts have also intermittently and openly engaged with a third standard 
of proof. For example, in the 1985 decision of Jory v British Columbia (College of Physicians 
& Surgeons) (“Jory”), an action regarding professional misconduct, Justice McLachlin (as 
she then was) stated:
The standard of proof in cases such as this is high. It is not the criminal 
standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt but it is something more 
than a bare balance of probabilities [...] The evidence must be sufficiently 
cogent to make it safe to uphold the findings with all the consequences for 
the professional person’s career and status in the community.17
Therefore, while the presumption of innocence is not fully engaged in these civil actions, 
the common thread of moral culpability is still evident. As a result, in light of such 
allegations of moral guilt, judicial intuition has periodically required “a degree of 
probability which is commensurate with the occasion”–or a third standard of proof.18
13 Ennis McBride, “Is the civil ‘higher standard of proof’ a coherent concept?” (2009) 8 Law, 
Probability and Risk 323 at 325.
14 McPhillips, supra note 6 at 141, citing British Columbia Telephone, supra note 6.
15 McBride, supra note 13 at 325. 
16 McPhillips, supra note 6 at 149, citing Addington, supra note 5 [emphasis added]. 
17 Q v College of Physicians & Surgeons (British Columbia) 2001 BCCA 241 at para 21, 198 DLR (4th) 250 
[Q v College of Physicians & Surgeons] (WL Can), citing Jory v British Columbia (College of Physicians), 
[1985] BCJ No 320 [Jory] [emphasis added]. 
18 Bater v Bater, [1950] 2 All ER 458 at 459, 66 TLR (Pt 2) 589 (ON CA) [Bater] (WL Can).
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III. ESTATE LITIGATION CONTEXT: PROBATE ACTIONS
Within the estate context, a probate action seeks a court order “pronouncing for or 
against the validity of an alleged testamentary paper.”19 When the validity of a will 
is contested in regards to “suspicious circumstances,” such allegations typically centre 
on events surrounding the preparation of the will, the capacity of the testator to know 
and understand the contents of the will, or circumstances that question whether the 
testamentary freedom or free will of the testator was corrupted by the fraud or undue 
influence of another party.20
A. Confusion regarding the Third Standard
However, in the Ontario Superior Court decision of Scott v Cousins, Justice Cullity 
highlighted the unique evidentiary issues encountered during will challenges alleging 
suspicious circumstances. According to Justice Cullity, “a deceased person’s knowledge 
and approval, testamentary capacity or capitulation to undue influence is often 
indeterminate.”21 In other words, even after a review of the deceased’s testamentary 
documents, contemporaneous memorandums created by their solicitor, or testimony 
from family members and others close to the testator, the ‘best’ witness regarding any 
suspicious circumstances around the will is still ultimately the deceased. Evidence from 
other sources may never be able to fill in the gaps and confidently confirm or disprove a 
nexus between the deceased’s testamentary capacity and any suspicious circumstances. 
Similarly, as outlined by Brian A. Schnurr, a leading author and specialist in estate 
litigation in Canada, confusion has also existed amongst the estates bar regarding the 
proper burdens and standards of proof for these probate actions:
Statements in earlier decisions [had] left it unclear as to whether the 
presence of suspicious circumstances imposed upon those propounding 
the will an onus higher than the general civil standard of proof on the 
balance of probabilities.22
For example, mixed signals emerged in the 1965 decision of MacGregor v Ryan, where the 
Supreme Court of Canada noted that a more onerous standard for all undue influence 
allegations would be a mistake, but that such a heavy burden may sometimes be warranted 
so “the extent of the proof required is proportionate to the gravity of the suspicion.”23 
Similarly, in the 1974 Ontario Court of Appeal decision of Re Bailey, the court addressed 
the “bleak disaster” of circumstances surrounding the will’s execution, and noted that 
the standard of proof would be more demanding “where suspicious circumstances are 
shown to exist” than in an ordinary dispute regarding testamentary capacity.24 
19 M Scott Kerwin, “Estate Litigation Basics – 2010 Update: Probate Actions” in Practice Made 
Perfect (Vancouver: Continuing Legal Education Society of British Columbia, 2010) at 7.1.4 citing 
Supreme Court Rules, BC Reg 221/90, R 21-4(1)(c).
20 Vout v Hay, supra note 4 at para 25.
21 Scott v Cousins, 37 ETR (2d) 113 at para 37, [2001] OJ No 19 [Scott v Cousins] (WL Can).
22 Brian A Schnurr, Estate Litigation, loose-leaf (consulted on January 20, 2013) (Toronto: Thomson 
Canada Limited, 1994) ch 2 at 12.
23 MacGregor v Ryan, [1965] SCR 757 at para 24, 53 DLR (2d) 126 [MacGregor]; please also see Maw 
v Dickey (1974), 6 OR (2d) 146 at para 68, 52 DLR (3d) 178 (Surrogate Court) for Justice Shapiro’s 
description of the MacGregor decision and “the heavy burden resting on the proponents of the 
will” due to the fact that the proponents were also found to be “instrumental in the preparation 
and execution of the will” [emphasis added].
24 Re Bailey (1974), 4 OR (2d) 315 at paras 4-9, 47 DLR (3d) 670 [Re Bailey] (WL Can).
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B. Clarification under Vout v Hay
However, in the 1995 decision of Vout v Hay, the Supreme Court of Canada directly 
addressed this confusion, and clarified both the burdens and standards of proof utilized 
in an action alleging suspicious circumstances.25 In this case, an elderly testator had 
previously left his entire estate to his brother and sister in equal shares.26 However, in 
1985 and at the age of 81, the testator executed a new will in which Vout, a 29-year-old 
friend, became the major beneficiary.27 Upon the testator’s death, his family contested 
the validity of the 1985 will due to various suspicious circumstances, including Vout 
personally giving instructions for the will over the telephone, Vout attending the lawyer’s 
office with the testator for execution, and the visible confusion of the testator when the 
contents of the will were read aloud to him at the time of signing.28
In a unanimous judgment, Justice Sopinka outlined the structure for a will challenge.29 
First, while a will that appears to adhere to all formalities is presumptively valid, this 
presumption is easily rebutted and extinguished upon introducing evidence of suspicious 
circumstances.30 Second, if the will challenge involves suspicious circumstances 
regarding the execution of the will or the testamentary capacity of the testator, then 
the legal burden of proof remains with the propounder of the will. 31 However, if the 
suspicious circumstances are raised in regard to allegations of fraud or undue influence 
over the testator, then the burden of proof is reserved and upon the party challenging the 
validity of the will.32 Third and most importantly, Justice Sopinka also directly clarified 
that suspicious circumstances do not impose a standard of proof beyond the balance of 
probabilities, and that the same civil standard is adopted for both the propounder and 
challenger of the will.33 
However, despite the decision of the Supreme Court in Vout v Hay, some uncertainty 
still remained. For example, in the will challenge of Brydon v Malamas, Justice Halfyard 
noted that in light of the “very strong suspicion” that the testatrix lacked testamentary 
capacity, “the proponent must prove testamentary capacity to a higher degree of certainty 
than a mere fifty-one percent probability.”34 
C. Reinforcement in McDougall
As a result of such lingering comments suggesting a third standard after Vout v Hay, the 
2008 Supreme Court of Canada decision of McDougall again sought to determinedly 
25 Vout v Hay, supra note 4.
26 Ibid at para 2.
27 Ibid at para 1.
28 Ibid at paras 3-4. 
29 Please note that in jurisdictions such as British Columbia, the onus of proving undue influence 
also traditionally rested upon the party challenging the validity of the will and mirrored the 
procedure in Ontario as described in Vout v Hay. However, once the Wills, Estates and Succession 
Act, SBC 2009, c 13 [WESA] comes into force on March 31, 2014 (see BC Reg 148/2013) this onus 
will be altered in certain instances. Specifically, under section 52 of WESA, after the party 
challenging the will has shown suspicious circumstances, the onus will now remain with the 
propounder of the will to prove that undue influence was not present—rather than rest upon 
the party challenging the will to show that undue influence was present.
30 Vout v Hay, supra note 4 at paras 26-27; Kerwin, supra note 19 at 7.1.5. As described in Scott v 
Cousins, supra note 21 at para 41, the level of evidence required to introduce the possibility of 
suspicious circumstances needs only to “excite the suspicion of the Court.”
31 Ibid at paras 19-20, as per the Succession Law Reform Act, RSO 1990, c S.26.
32 Ibid at para 21. As noted at para 28, this reversal reflects the “policy in favour of honouring the 
wishes of the testator where it is established that the formalities have been complied with, and 
knowledge and approval as well as testamentary capacity have been established.”
33 Ibid at paras 23-24.
34 Brydon v Malamas, 2008 BCSC 749 at paras 51, 158, 41 ETR (3d) 104 [Brydon] (WL Can).
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address this longstanding tension between the “balance of probabilities and cases in 
which allegations made against a defendant are particularly grave.”35 The court’s finding 
on the inapplicability of a third standard was particularly clear:
I think it is time to say, once and for all in Canada, that there is only one 
civil standard of proof at common law and that is proof on a balance of 
probabilities. Of course, context is all important and a judge should not be 
unmindful, where appropriate, of inherent probabilities or improbabilities 
or the seriousness of the allegations or consequences. However, these 
considerations do not change the standard of proof.36 
Similarly, the court clarified that the distinction between the civil and criminal standards 
of proof is based only on the latter engaging the presumption of innocence, before 
outlining the “practical problems” associated with utilizing a third standard.37
IV. COMMENTARY AND CRITIQUE
The following commentary and critique will investigate questions and concerns 
about identifying exactly where the third standard of proof resides on a spectrum of 
probabilities, and when this additional standard of proof should apply in probate actions. 
In addition, the unique structure of will challenges will be reviewed, as well as a brief 
discussion about the persistence of the judiciary’s desire and intuition to reference a 
third standard of proof despite the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in McDougall. 
Finally, this section will discuss the evidentiary demands upon the party challenging the 
contested will, before concluding with recommendations on how to accurately convey 
the location of the third standard of proof to a finder of fact.
A. Where the Third Standard Resides
As noted above, there are various practical and procedural problems and concerns 
with utilizing a third standard of proof. First, it would be necessary to clearly identify 
where the standard resides, and confidently convey this location to the finder of fact.38 
Certainly, operating on a balance of probabilities, or deciding that something is more 
likely than not, is much easier to conceptualize than trying to describe the precise 
location of the third standard on a spectrum of certainty.39 This argument against the 
third standard is also linked to the law’s preference for utilizing a non-mathematical 
approach to describe probability, as according to the Baconian school of thought, and 
explicit judicial concerns that a lay juror cannot readily understand the concept of sixty 
percent or seventy percent probability.40 
However, some proponents of the Pascalian, or mathematical, approach have argued that 
this blanket refusal to utilize percentages undermines both the competence of the finder 
of fact and the historical faith in the jury in Canada, as it has been adopted in other 
jurisdictions, and speaking of a sixty percent or seventy percent probability “would not 
35 McDougall, supra note 1 at para 26. The particularly grave allegations in this case involved 
accusations that McDougall, a school supervisor, had repeatedly sexually assaulted FH when he 
was a ten year old student at the Sechelt Indian Residential School between 1968-1969.
36 Ibid at para 40 [emphasis added].
37 Ibid at paras 41, 43.
38 McBride, supra note 13 at 327, citing Lord Nicholls in Re H & Ors (minors) [1995] UKHL 16, [1996] AC 
563 [Re H & Ors].
39 McDougall, supra note 1 at para 43, citing Linda R Rothstein, Robert A Centa & Eric Adams, 
“Balancing Probabilities: The Overlooked Complexity of the Civil Standard of Proof” in Special 
Lectures 2003: The Law of Evidence (Irwin Law: Toronto, 2004) at 466.
40 Ibid at para 43; McPhillips, supra note 6 at 150-151.
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give even the most uneducated gambler any difficulty whatsoever.”41 In addition, when 
conceptualized along a spectrum in reference to proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the 
civil balance of probabilities, describing the location of the third standard of proof will 
hardly occur in an inaccessible or vague conceptual vacuum. 
Similarly, due the infrequent use of civil juries throughout Canada, the third standard 
may not even regularly be conveyed to the laymen of the jury. For example, in British 
Columbia, civil juries are only utilized in approximately three to ten percent of trials.42 
Although the use of civil juries has increased in Ontario to about twenty-two percent, 
the Ontario Law Reform Commission report on civil juries found that approximately 
seventy-five percent of these civil jury trials were for tortious actions regarding motor 
vehicle accidents.43 Yet even for the rare cases in which a civil jury is utilized during 
a will challenge involving moral guilt in Canada, taking the time to carefully and 
cautiously instruct the jury about the location of a third standard of proof is certainly 
no more daunting or challenging than conveying the criminal standard of proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt—a standard which judges regularly and successfully convey during 
their instructions or charge to the jury.
B. When the Third Standard Applies
Second, applying a third standard would also require a clear determination of when this 
standard applies.44 Indeed, there are procedural benefits to utilizing a strict dichotomy 
between civil actions on a balance of probabilities and offences requiring proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt so that the type of action is directly linked to what standard of proof 
will be utilized. It has also been argued that as the presumption of innocence is not 
engaged, a lower standard of proof is acceptable since “society is indifferent” to which 
party wins a civil suit, thus making it “unnecessary to protect against an erroneous result 
by requiring a standard of proof higher than a balance of probabilities.”45 
Yet in reality, society is hardly indifferent to the results of all civil suits, or probate actions 
where the burden of proof rests on the party challenging the will. For example, a judicial 
finding that an individual engaged in fraudulent behaviour surrounding a will, or placed 
a coercive and undue influence upon a testator, is certainly linked to a significant loss 
of reputation and social stigma within one’s family and broader community. Similarly, 
allegations of being the “officious adult child”, “nefarious caregiver” or “predatory 
spouse” carry deep connotations suggestive of the unethical nature of the individual 
under scrutiny.46 Therefore, despite not being categorized as an offense, such allegations 
of the defendant’s moral blameworthiness are still present in civil will challenges. As 
a result, the presence of an intermediate and third standard of proof, when the moral 
character of an individual is in question, is certainly beneficial in consideration of the 
overall allocation of judicial error and potential negative impact upon the party facing 
such allegations.
41 McPhillips, supra note 6 at 156. 
42 W A Bogart, “Guardian of Civil Rights… Medieval Relic: the Civil Jury in Canada” (1999) 62(2) Law 
& Contemp Probs 305 at 311-312. Please note that the Ontario Law Reform Commission report 
relies on data collected in 1994-1995, and more recent data was not located.
43 Ibid at 312, 317.
44 McBride, supra note 13 at 327, citing Re H & Ors, supra note 38.
45 McDougall, supra note 1 at para 42, citing John Sopinka, Sidney N Lederman and Alan W Bryant, 
The Law of Evidence in Canada, 2d ed (Butterworths: Toronto, 1999) at 154. 
46 David M Smith, “The Challenge of Detecting Undue Influence” 17:1 The Probator (March 2012) 
online: Hull & Hull LLP Barristers and Solicitors <http://www.hullandhull.com/Media-Centre/
March-2012-Probater-Final.pdf >. 
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C. Unique Structure of Will Challenges
Yet the above discussion implies that the propounder of the will is also the party 
facing allegations of fraud or undue influence: for example, in Vout v Hay, the executor 
and propounder of the will was also the major beneficiary accused of corrupting the 
testamentary freedom of the deceased. As a result, Vout was present and deeply engaged 
in the litigation to defend herself against the social stigma of the allegations.
While the executor and propounder of the will is often the party facing such allegations 
of moral guilt, this is not always the case. Rather, the executor and propounder of the will 
may simply be seeking a certified or “probated” copy of the will to assume control of the 
testator’s assets to administer the estate.47 Therefore, the party facing allegations of fraud 
or undue influence may not fit into the clear and traditional dynamic of will challenger 
and propounder, or the traditional division of plaintiff and defendant. Consequently, 
the alleged fraudster may have a more remote engagement with the proceedings and 
will challenge as a whole, such as being the spouse of the propounder of the will or the 
son-in-law of the testator. While more remote parties may be called as witnesses, unlike 
traditional defendants, they are not guaranteed the same control and engagement with 
the defense strategy assessing their moral guilt. 
Therefore, while the latter dynamic takes on the appearance of assessing the validity of 
the testamentary document on a balance of probabilities, in reality the action is ultimately 
discerning the moral guilt of an individual within this same lower standard of proof. 
Certainly, discerning the moral guilt of an individual with a more remote engagement on 
a mere balance of probabilities is particularly concerning. As a result, the protection of 
this remote individual from judicial error and stigma favours the utilization of a standard 
of proof beyond the balance of probabilities due to their inability to provide a traditional 
defendant’s right to fully participate in their own defense. 
D. Legal Reality of a Silent Third Standard
Yet regardless of McDougall’s pronouncement that there are only two standards of 
proof, the intuition of judges and of the court still seems to desire something more than 
the balance of probabilities in the face of allegations of moral guilt. As a result, the 
language of the court seems to illustrate attempts to preserve a silent third standard into 
deliberations of fraud or undue influence. For example, commentary that the burden of 
proof is “proportionate to the gravity of the suspicion” still appeared in recent judicial 
decisions, including the 2013 decision of Laszlo v Lawton regarding undue influence 
from the testatrix’s husband.48 Similarly, the 2013 decision of Wassilyn v Rick Zeron 
Stables Inc (“Wassilyn”) stated:
Where allegations are framed in fraud, and have criminal or quasi-criminal 
undertones, the Plaintiff is required to prove such allegations on a standard 
of proof higher than the common civil standard or balance of probabilities. 
The evidence must be scrutinized in a manner commensurate with the 
gravity of the allegation.49
Other recent actions also approvingly cite references to “a strong balance of probabilities,” 
and the consideration of something beyond a balance of probabilities when questions of 
47 Howard S Black, Wills and Estates: Cases, Text and Materials (Toronto: Edmond Montgomery 
Publications, 2009) at 38.
48 Laszlo v Lawton, 2013 BCSC 305 at para 205, 226 ACWS (3d) 911(WL Can).
49 Wassilyn v Rick Zeron Stables Inc, 2013 ONSC 127 at para 67, 225 ACWS (3d) 275 [Wassilyn] (WL Can)
[emphasis added].
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moral guilt are at issue.50 As a result, despite McDougall stating that there should only be 
two standards of proof in Canada, various finders of fact are still clearly communicating 
their desire for a standard of proof beyond a balance of probabilities when addressing 
allegations of moral guilt. In addition, judgments such as Wassilyn demonstrate the 
ability and competence of the court to clearly express not only the general location of this 
third standard of proof, but also highlight the need for such a standard when allegations 
of moral guilt such as fraud arise. 
E. Implication of Rebutting Presumption of Validity and Reversed Onus 
Despite McDougall, a silent third standard also continues to exist due to the manner that 
will challenges precede, and the distance that evidence alleging fraud or undue influence 
must travel to persuade the trier of fact. 
For example, as noted above, a will that complies with the formalities of execution under 
Ontario’s Succession Law Reform Act benefits from an initial presumption of validity.51 
To rebut this presumption of validity, the party challenging the will must first submit 
evidence sufficient to “excite the suspicion of the court” that suspicious circumstances 
were present.52 If the court is intrigued, and the suspicious circumstances involve fraud or 
undue influence, the burden of proof for these allegations rests with the party challenging 
the will. As a result, in addition to their preliminary evidence, the party challenging 
the will must then submit additional evidence sufficient to satisfy the finder of fact on a 
balance of probabilities. Therefore, when the initial evidence to overcome the presumption 
of validity is combined with the additional evidence needed to satisfy the civil standard, 
the evidential distance travelled by the challenging party can be interpreted as going 
beyond the civil standard and into the realm of a third standard of proof.
F. Recommendations for Describing the Third Standard in Canada
While this paper has argued for both the acknowledgement of what is currently described 
as a silent third standard, as well as the endorsement of this third standard in cases 
involving moral guilt, the precise location of this standard must still be solidified. For 
practical purposes, identification of the location of the third standard would enable it to 
be confidently and consistently applied by the finder of fact. This author would advocate 
for a Pascalian or mathematical approach to clearly communicate the precise location 
of this third standard; surveys of the American judiciary have typically described it as 
residing in the range of seventy to eighty percent probability.53 
However, utilizing percentages to communicate legal probabilities would be a radical 
change within the Canadian legal system. As a result, perhaps the most eloquent manner 
of communicating the location of this third standard in non-mathematical terms was the 
above-cited decision of Jory by Justice McLachlin (as she then was). Justice McLachlin 
described the third standard as an intermediate standard, not quite proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt and yet “something more than a bare balance of probabilities,” 
which rests upon evidence that “must be sufficiently cogent to make it safe to uphold 
50 W (KRM) v Nova Scotia (Minister of Community Services), 2010 NSFC 27 at para 11, 297 NSR (2d) 248 
(WL Can), citing H(P) v H, 72 NSR (2d) 104 at para 28, 173 APR 104.
51 Succession Law Reform Act, RSO 1990, c S.26.
52 Kerwin, supra note 19 at 7.1.5.
53 David L Schwartz & Christopher B Seaman, “Standards of Proof in Civil Litigation: An Experiment 
from Patent Law” (2013) 26(2) Harv JL & Tech 429 at 430, 439. Please see references to “clear 
and convincing evidence,” also described as the “intermediate standard” by the authors. 
The authors’ summary of these surveys also noted that the civil balance of probabilities was 
anything beyond fifty percent probability, while respondents stated that beyond a reasonable 
doubt required “at least 80% probability.”
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the findings with all the consequences” for the individual’s reputation.54 However, 
such a non-mathematical determination would certainly benefit from a detailed report 
and review by both the Law Reform Commission of Canada and the Canadian Bar 
Association’s Legislation and Law Reform Committee. Such a review should also include 
an assessment of the language and descriptions utilized by jurisdictions that currently 
employ a third standard of proof. This would allow the description of the third standard 
of proof to quickly mature to a similar level of clarity that the current civil and criminal 
standards currently enjoy in Canadian jurisprudence. 
CONCLUSION
As noted above, there are various practical and procedural reasons for utilizing only two 
standards of proof. For example, it can be difficult to clearly communicate to the finder of 
fact where the precise location of a third standard of proof resides, and the judicial system 
benefits from the procedural simplicity of automatically allocating a lower standard of 
proof to civil actions and a higher standard of proof to offenses and situations clearly 
engaging moral blameworthiness. 
However, despite these concerns, compelling arguments still persist for employing 
something beyond a balance of probabilities when allegations of moral guilt, such as 
fraud or undue influence, are present in a probate action. After all, once such allegations 
of moral guilt arise, the danger of an individual incurring a significant loss of reputation 
or social stigma through a finding against them also emerges. In such situations, it is 
no longer appropriate to equally allocate the risk of error between parties on the civil 
balance of probabilities. As a result, when such allegations of moral guilt are present, the 
need to protect an individual from both judicial error and social stigma benefits from 
embracing a third standard of proof that is beyond the civil balance of probabilities and 
yet less than a finding beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Similarly, notwithstanding McDougall, a silent third standard still informally continues 
due to the court’s intuitive desire for clear and compelling evidence when addressing claims 
of fraud or undue influence. In addition, the cumulative evidential demands of a third 
standard of proof also linger by requiring the party challenging the will to first overcome 
the presumption of validity and then to also succeed on a balance of probabilities. 
While utilizing this third standard of proof may be more challenging in a judicial 
system weary of percentages, such additional procedural effort will help offset the risk 
of unwarranted social stigma being assigned to parties facing allegations of moral guilt, 
and therefore necessitates our continuing consideration. The third standard of proof 
acknowledges this need to carefully allocate the risk of error in civil actions involving 
allegations of moral guilt due to the significant loss of reputation and social stigma that 
follows such a judicial sanction or finding, and would therefore be a powerful addition 
to the manner in which we address probate actions alleging suspicious circumstances 
and moral guilt. 
54 Q v College of Physicians & Surgeons, supra note 17 at para 21, citing Jory.
